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CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
Edward P. Nolde*
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the first year the University of Richmond Law Review
has surveyed Virginia law concerning developments in the area of
consumer protection. Thus, this article includes background mate-
rial as well as recent developments that are more than one year
old. Except as background for the current statutes, this survey
does not discuss the common law torts of fraud and constructive
fraud. Although these common law actions remain important to
consumers, they have been discussed in several other recent
publications.1
The majority of Virginia consumer protection statutes are found
in Title 59.1 of the Code of Virginia.2 Chapter 17 contains the Vir-
ginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (VCPA).5 Chapter 17 sets
forth certain rules of conduct, and incorporates by reference sev-
eral other acts providing rights to consumers. Most of the incorpo-
rated acts cover specific types of businesses, such as health spas,4
membership campgrounds,5 extended service contracts,' and auto-
* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia; B.A., 1970, J.D., 1973, Univer-
sity of Virginia.
Copyright 1993 Commonwealth of Virginia. Reprinted with the permission of the Office of
the Attorney General. The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and do
not constitute an opinion of the Attorney General or the Office of the Attorney General.
The following discussion first addresses recent developments in substantive law with some
contextual background material about older statutes. This article secondly discusses proce-
dural matters and developments relating to consumer suits filed by both private individuals
and government attorneys.
1. E.g., Stephen M. Sayers, The Law of Fraud in Virginia, in THE TORTS OF REVENGE
(1991).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -459 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
3. V&. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
4. Virginia Health Spa Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-294 to -310 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum.
Supp. 1993).
5. Virginia Membership Camping Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-311 to -335 (Repl. Vol. 1992
& Cum. Supp. 1993).
6. Extended Service Contract Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-435 to -441 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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mobile repair facilities.7 Generally, civil remedies are awarded for
violations of Title 59.1.8
The basic tools for consumer protection are the common law ac-
tions for fraud and constructive fraud, and the statutory action for
violation of the VCPA, Each was designed to attack misrepresenta-
tion used as an inducement to contract. Fraud requires the
speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the statement and an intent
to deceive.9 Constructive fraud, on the other hand, lies where the
speaker innocently, but mistakenly, represents something to be
true that is not.10 The VCPA addresses both intentional and unin-
tentional misrepresentations," as well as other conduct which is
not obviously deceptive.12
In 1992, the General Assembly enacted the Virginia Residential
Property Disclosure Act (VRPDA),13 which is applicable to many
real estate sales. In some transactions, the VRPDA will provide
vendors a means of defense against common law construction
fraud actions. 4 In others, the common law rules will continue. In
any event, the passage of the VRPDA now requires that individual
real estate transactions be reviewed under four different state re-
gimes: common law fraud, common law constructive fraud, the
VCPA, and the VRPDA.
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977
1. Applicability
The Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (VCPA) applies
to "consumer transactions," which include (a) the advertisement,
sale, lease, or offering for sale or lease of goods, land, intangibles or
7. Automobile Repair Facilities Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.1 to 207.6 (Repl. VoL
1992).
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-206 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
9. Winn v. Aleda Constr. Co., 227 Va. 304, 308, 315 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1984).
10. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 833-34, 27 S.E.2d 198, 202
(1943).
11. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-206A (Repl. Vol. 1992) (willful violations) with § 59.1-
207 (unintentional violations).
12. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.4 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (automobile repair facility required
to offer return of replaced parts to customer).
13. Act of Apr. 4, 1992, ch. 717, 1992 Va. Acts 1096 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517
to -525 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
14. See infra section I[ (c)(7).
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services to be used primarily for "personal, family or household"
purposes; (b) business opportunities to be conducted from a resi-
dence by an individual; and (3) services related to finding a job.15
In a case of first impression, the sale of roofing materials to a
building contractor was held not to constitute a consumer transac-
tion as the materials were not to be used by the contractor primar-
ily for personal, family, or household purposes.' 6
The rules of conduct for consumer transactions are applied to
"suppliers.'1 7 These are sellers or lessors who advertise, solicit or
engage in "consumer transactions," or manufacturers or distribu-
tors who advertise and sell or lease goods or services to be resold or
leased by other persons in "consumer transactions." 8
One decision held that VCPA was intended to cover only com-
mercial entities that advertise, sell, or lease as a business. 19 On this
reasoning, an individual selling his one building lot in an isolated,
occasional transaction was not engaged in consumer transactions."0
Circuit court decisions disagree on the question of whether real es-
tate agents are covered by VCPA.2'
2. Exclusions
The VCPA excludes certain conduct by "suppliers" as well as all
conduct by certain kinds of businesses.22 Those aspects of con-
sumer transactions authorized by other statutes or regulations are
excluded.23 It is important, however, to distinguish "authorized"
from silence and absence of prohibition. The failure of an agency
to forbid a particular practice does not mean that the agency has
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
16. Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 27 Va. Cir. 62, 63 (Fairfax County
1992).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
18. Id.
19. Sullivan v. Reliable Realty, 16 Va. Cir. 118 (Clarke County 1989).
20. Id. at 126-27.
21. Compare Port Royal Condominium Ass'n v. Crossland Say. FSB, 15 Va. Cir. 239, 243
(Alexandria City 1989); Messer v. Re/Max Properties, Inc., 15 Va. Cir. 15, 16-17 (Fairfax
County 1985); Messer v. Shannon & Lucks Co., 15 Va. Cir. 18 (Fairfax County 1985) (real
estate agents are analogous to distributors and are covered by VCPA) with Alvarez v. Dekar
Homes, Inc., 17 Va. Cir. 250, 250-52 (Fairfax County 1989); Sullivan at 126-27 (agent not
included because principal, as isolated, occasional seller not engaged in business, excluded
from definition of "supplier").
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-199 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-199(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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"authorized" the practice.2 4 The effect of this language may sur-
prise those who are already regulated by an agency such as a medi-
cal professions board or a contractors board; they are also subject
to suit under the VCPA. Though not subject to suit under the
VCPA, this particular exclusion precludes any inconsistent rule of
conduct.
The Federal Aviation Administration, for example, permits air-
lines to overbook, as long as they provide certain disclosures at
ticket counters and in printed tickets and provide certain alterna-
tive accommodations. 25 This express authorization precludes a con-
sumer from winning a VCPA suit challenging the practice as de-
ceptive and the disclosure as inadequate to cure the deception.
Those aspects of a transaction that are regulated by the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act 26 are also excluded. This is not a
blanket exemption for every transaction subject to truth-in-lending
disclosures, which are designed to require meaningful disclosure of
credit terms. The Truth-In-Lending Act does not address misrep-
resentation about facts other than credit terms, thus the VCPA
may apply in conjunction with this federal legislation. 7 Certain
regulated industries, such as banks, savings and loan associations,
small loan companies, public service companies and insurance
companies regulated by the State Corporation Commission or a
comparable federal agency, and licensed employment agencies are
completely excluded from VCPA.28 This exclusion is based on the
assumption that the appropriate administrative agency is in fact
actively prohibiting its regulatees from engaging in deceptive
practices.
3. Prohibited Practices
The VCPA forbids a supplier, in connection with a consumer
transaction, to commit any of a list of particular practices, to en-
24. Cf. West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 582 (W.D. Va. 1983) ("'permitted by law' is
different from 'not prohibited by law.' ").
25. 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.1-.11 (1993) (oversales).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (1988 & Supp. IH 1991).
27. Port Royal Condominium Ass'n v. Crossland Sav. FSB, 15 Va. Cir. 239, 243 (Alexan-
dria City 1989); Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Glasby, 230 Va. 422, 443, 337 S.E.2d 291, 298-99
(1985). But see Smith v. United States Credit Corp., 626 F. Supp. 102, 102-03 (E.D. Va.
1985), afl'd, 801 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1986).
28. V. CODE ANN. § 59.1-199(D)-(E) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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gage in any other deceptive practices, or to violate any of the other
statutes which are incorporated by reference.2"
The particular prohibitions include: misrepresenting goods or
services as those of another;30 misrepresenting the source, sponsor-
ship, approval, certification, quantities, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, standard, quality, grade, style, model, and origin;
31
advertising or offering used, repossessed, blemished, deteriorated,
irregular, imperfect, or reconditioned goods for sale "without
clearly and unequivocally" disclosing such in the advertisement or
offer;32 advertising goods or services with the intent not to sell as
advertised or at prices or upon terms advertised;3 3 false or mislead-
ing statements of reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price re-
ductions;3 4 use in contract of any liquidated damage clause, pen-
alty clause, or waiver of defense which, under some other
substantive law, is unenforceable; attempting to collect such dam-
ages or penalties;35 or using any other deception, fraud, false pre-
tense, false promise, or misrepresentation in connection with a
consumer transaction. 6 Under this subsection misrepresentation
by silence or omission may violate VCPA.37
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered a consumer
case that was litigated under a theory of unilateral contract.3
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
30. Id. § 59.1-200(1).
31. Id. § 59.1-200(2-6); see Valley Acceptance Co. v. Glasby, 230 Va. 422, 337 S.E.2d 291
(1985) (loan arranger represented it would find favorable loan terms, but instead placed loan
with its corporate president as lender without disclosing their relationship); Gill v. Rollins
Protective Serv. Co., 722 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1983) (fire alarm system represented as automati-
cally calling fire department and being virtually foolproof).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200(7) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
33. Id. § 59.1-200(8).
34. Id. § 59.1-200(9).
35. Id. § 59.1-200(13).
36. Id. § 59.1-200(14).
37. In re American Dollar Exch., Inc., 27 Va. Cir. 428, 428-30 (Campbell County 1992)
(representation that a prominent Tennessee banker hoarded barrels of silver coins because
of their investment value could be considered deceptive in violation of VCPA because of the
omission of the additional fact that the banker had been convicted of various felonies in
connection with the failure of his bank); see Valley Acceptance, 230 Va. at 432-33, 337
S.E.2d at 297 (failure to disclose that lender was president and owner of corporate loan
finder which had promised to find favorable loan terms violates VCPA); 1985-86 Va. Att'y
Gen. Ann. Rep. 324, 324-25 (Aug. 21, 1985) (duty of automobile dealers to disclose prior
damage and repair of vehicles).
38. See Chang v. First Colonial Say. Bank, 242 Va. 388, 410 S.E.2d 928 (1991). Although
the bank's conduct was arguably deceptive, § 59.1-199(D) exempted the bank from suit
under the VCPA. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-199(D) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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There is a distinction in contract law between an advertisement's
solicitation of offers and an advertisement's making of an offer
that can be accepted by performance. The usual rule is that an
advertisement merely solicits offers.39 Some advertisements, how-
ever, make an offer that can be accepted by unilateral conduct. In
Chang v. First Colonial Savings Bank,4 ° the court considered a
bank advertisement that offered to return $20,136.12 for $14,000.00
invested in one of its certificates of deposit for three-and-one-half
years. The advertisement disclosed an interest rate of eight and
three-quarter percent.4 In response to the advertisement, the
Changs gave their money to First Colonial.42 The certificate of de-
posit disclosed an interest rate of eight and three-quarter percent,
but did not mention the amount to be repaid to the Changs upon
maturity. Upon maturity, the bank paid the Changs less than the
amount advertised.43 The bank argued that the $20,136.12 amount
stated in the advertisement was an error, while the advertisement
and certificate of deposit both stated the correct interest rate,
which the bank paid. The court held that the bank's advertisement
made an offer that the Changs could and did accept by their uni-
lateral performance of depositing their money.44 The court held
that the Changs were entitled to the advertised return of
$20,136.12. 45 Of particular significance in the opinion is the bank's
failure for three-and-one-half years to correct the misunderstand-
ing created in the Changs' minds by the advertising.46
Various other acts are incorporated into VCPA by reference.
These include the Automobile Repair Facilities Act,47 Virginia
Health Spa Act,48 the Home Solicitation Sales Act,49 the Prizes and
Gifts Act,50 the Extended Service Contract Act,51 the Virginia
Membership Camping Act,52 and the Credit Services Businesses
39. Id. at 391, 410 S.E.2d at 930.
40. 242 Va. 388, 410 S.E.2d 928 (1991).
41. Id. at 389, 410 S.E.2d at 929.
42. Id. at 390, 410 S.E.2d at 929.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 391, 410 S.E.2d at 930.
45. Id. at 393, 410 S.E.2d at 931.
46. Id. at 392, 410 S.E.2d at 931.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.1 to -207.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
48. Id. §§ 59.1-294 to -310 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
49. Id. §§ 59.1-21.1 to -21.7 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
50. Id. §§ 59.1-415 to -423 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
51. Id. §§ 59.1-435 to -441 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
52. Id. §§ 59.1-311 to -335 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
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Act.53 Most recently, the legislature added the Travel Club Act."
In 1993, the General Assembly made certain rules for the towing of
motor vehicles from private property enforceable through the
VCPA, but only until July 1, 1994. 55
The Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act,5" popu-
larly known as the Lemon Law, however, is not enforceable
through the VCPA. The Lemon Law creates its own separate cause
of action.5  It is enforceable only by private parties and not by any
agency of state or local government.
4. Intent to Deceive
Proof of intent to deceive is not necessary to permit a finding of
deceptive conduct in violation of the statute. Although this pro-
position is not explicit in the VCPA, it is easily inferred from the
last clause of section 59.1-207, which addresses unintentional viola-
tions: "nothing in this section shall prevent the court from order-
ing restitution to individuals aggrieved as a result of an uninten-
tional violation of section 59.1-200." 5
B. Virginia Health Spa Act
Generally, the Virginia Health Spa Act59 applies to contracts
that require payment for more than three months in advance. A
contract with large "initiation fees," coupled with a short member-
ship of less than three months, and inexpensive monthly or yearly
renewals thereafter, is also included within the act. This prohibits
circumvention of the act by initial collection of almost all the
membership fee with only nominal periodic renewal charges.60
53. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-369.1 to -369.10 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
54. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 760, 1993 Va. Acts 1038 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
445 to -454)(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
55. Act of March 22, 1993, ch. 455, 1993 Va. Acts 538 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
200.32 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cure. Supp. 1993). The rules of conduct may be found in VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1231 and 46.2-1233.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cu . Supp. 1993).
56. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.9 to -207.16 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
57. Id. § 59.1-207.14.
58. Id. § 59.1-207.
59. Id. §§ 59.1-294 to -310 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cur. Supp. 1993).
60. Id. § 59.1-296.3 (Repl. Vol. 1992). For memberships of 12 months or longer, however,
an initiation fee not to exceed seventy-five dollars may be charged. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
306(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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For contracts covered by this act, consumers have a right to can-
cel in certain circumstances.61 This right must be disclosed in the
contract.6 2 The consumer may cancel for any or no reason at any
time prior to midnight of the third business day after signing the
contract. Upon cancellation, the spa must refund all moneys paid
under the contract.63
If the spa relocates more than five driving miles away or goes out
of business, and in either event, fails to provide alternative facili-
ties within five driving miles, then the spa must make a pro rata
refund based on the proportion of the contract which was
honored. 4 Likewise, the spa owes a pro rata refund if the con-
sumer dies or becomes physically unable to use a substantial por-
tion of the spa services for thirty or more consecutive days. 5
In 1992, the General Assembly limited the permissible length of
health spa contracts. Subject to certain exceptions, no contract
shall have a duration longer than thirty-six months, including any
renewal period.66 Every legal contract longer than thirty-six
months must permit the consumer to cancel after twelve months,
upon thirty days notice.67 Thus, a spa that attempts to lock in a
customer for more than thirty-six months may lose that customer
after only one year and would be better off using only a thirty-six
month term.
C. Lease-Purchase Agreement Act
Under the Lease-Purchase Agreement Act,68 covered lessors are
required to make certain, written disclosures to consumer lessees.69
Enforcement is through the Virginia Consumer Protection Act.0
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-297 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
62. Id. § 59.1-298.
63. Id. § 59.1-297(1).
64. Id. § 59.1-297(2).
65. Id. § 59.1-297(3).
66. Act of Mar. 3, 1992, ch. 117, 1992 Va. Acts 130 (codified at V& CODE ANN. § 59.1-299
(Repl. Vol. 1992)).
67. Id.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.17 to -207.27 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
69. Id. § 59.1-207.21.
70. Id. § 59.1-207.27.
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D. Prizes and Gifts Act
If any person represents that another person has "won" anything
in connection with the sale or lease of goods, property or services,
the Prizes and Gifts Act71 requires that he actually deliver the
prize within ten days without obligation and at no expense to the
recipient. 2 If any person represents that another person has a
chance to win or receive anything in connection with the sale or
lease of goods, property or services, he must disclose: (1) on whose
behalf the promotion is conducted; (2) all material conditions (3)
the actual retail value of the prize or gift; (4) the number of each
item to be awarded; and (5) the odds of receiving each item.3
The United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, recently considered a scheme in which the supplier led con-
sumers to believe that appliances were free bonus items given to
purchasers of cleaning products. 4 The court found, in fact, that
the consumers were purchasing the appliances, and the appliances
were used as collateral to finance the contracts. The court held
that the supplier's failure to disclose that it was really selling the
appliances violated the requirement that all material conditions be
disclosed. 6
Suppliers must disclose the actual retail value of the offered
prize or gift. The retail value is defined as either the price at which
substantial sales were made in the area within the last ninety days
or the actual cost to the promoter plus no more than seven hun-
dred percent.76 A supplier which merely affirmed the consumer's
guess or estimate of the retail value did not satisfy the requirement
that the retail value be disclosed.
E. Virginia Membership Camping Act
The Virginia Membership Camping Act" defines membership
camping contracts as those that allow the consumer the nonexclu-
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-415 to -423 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-416 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
73. Id. § 59.1-417.
74. In re Fravel, 143 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992), af'd, Civil No. 2:92cv748 (E.D.
Va. Jan 8, 1993).
75. Id. at 1014.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-417(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
77. Fravel, 143 B.R. at 1014.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-311 to -335 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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sive use of a campground together with other consumers for a pe-
riod of more than one year's duration.7 9 The definition also in-
cludes those campgrounds that deed title or other ownership
interest to the consumer, subject to use restrictions which provide
the consumer with only a nonexclusive right to use the facilities
together with other purchasers.8 0 The campground may sell as
many as fifteen memberships for each camping site.,' The camp-
ground must provide to each purchaser, prior to execution of the
contract, a disclosure statement including, among other things, no-
tice of the purchaser's right to cancel without penalty prior to mid-
night of the seventh calendar day following the date on which the
purchaser executes the contract.2
E. Virginia Credit Services Business Act
1. Covered Entities
The Virginia Credit Services Business Act (VCSBA)s8 defines a
credit services business as any entity which represents that, in re-
turn for payment of consideration, it can or will improve a con-
sumer's credit record, obtain an extension of credit for a consumer,
or provide assistance in such improvement or extension. 4
2. Registration and Bonding
Every credit services business must register with the Virginia
Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services. The Com-
missioner has delegated registration to the Division of Consumer
Affairs. 5 Every credit services business must file with the Commis-
sioner a bond with corporate surety in an amount equal to one
hundred times the standard fee charged by it, but in no event less
than $5,000 or more than $50,000.86
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-313 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
80. Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-317(C).
82. Id. § 59.1-326.
83. Id. §§ 59.1-335.1 to -355.12.
84. Id. § 59.1-335.2.
85. Id. § 59.1-335.3.
86. Id. § 59.1-335.4.
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3. Advance Payment and Certain Practices Prohibited
Credit services businesses cannot be paid until they have per-
formed the service for the consumer."' Further, they cannot be
paid merely for a referral to a credit grantor who will or may ex-
tend credit to the consumer upon terms substantially the same as
the credit grantor offers to the general public.8" Credit services
businesses are also forbidden to make any untrue or misleading
statements to a consumer reporting agency or other creditor or
prospective creditor with respect to a consumer's credit
worthiness."9
4. Consumer Rights
A credit services business must provide its customers with cer-
tain disclosures including a notice that they have no obligation to
pay anything until all of the services have been performed.90 Con-
tracts used by credit services businesses must contain a conspicu-
ous statement providing the consumer with the right to cancel the
transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day
after the contract is signed.9 1 Any contract for services from a
credit services business that does not comply with the VCSBA is
void and unenforceable. 92 A consumer may not waive any provi-
sions of the act.93 A violation of the VCSBA is a violation of the
VCPA. 4
The VCSBA has a two-year statute of limitations except that, if
the defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any in-
formation the VCSBA requires to be disclosed, and that informa-
tion is material to the establishment of the defendant's liability,
87. Id. 5 9.1-335.5.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 59.1-335.7.
91. Id. § 59.1-335.8.
92. Id. § 59.1-335.9(B).
93. Id. § 59.1-335.9(C).
94. Id. § 59.1-335.12. The Office of the Attorney General obtained a comprehensive tem-
porary injunction forbidding the offering of credit services by an unregistered business, for-
bidding certain misrepresentations, and freezing corporate and individual officer's assets in
Commonwealth v. Loan Consultants, Inc., No. CH90-1134 (Chesterfield County Cir. Ct.
Nov. 16, 1990). Subsequently, a receiver was appointed to liquidate the business. Permanent
injunction by Consent, Final Judgment and Order Appointing Receiver (June 6, 1992).
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the action may be brought within two years after discovery of the
misrepresentation. 5
G. Comparison Price Advertising Act
The Comparison Price Advertising Act9 addresses both a sup-
plier's advertisements of its own former prices and the supplier's
advertisement of the prices charged by its competitors. The law is
unusual in at least two regards. First, as to comparative prices of
one's competitors, the act shifts the initial burden of proof in the
investigative stage of any proceeding from the Commonwealth to
the advertising supplier. Upon the request of the Commonwealth,
the supplier is required to substantiate any advertised comparative
price.9 7 The act does not require the Commonwealth to have cause
to investigate. 8 Instead, the supplier bears the responsibility to
prove all comparative competitor prices used.
Second, as to former or comparative prices advertised in terms
of "manufacturer's suggested price," "suggested retail price," "list
price" or similar words, the Federal Trade Commission Act and
relevant regulations of the Federal Trade Commission are adopted
by reference. 9
Comparative price advertisements are permitted if the advertiser
can substantiate that the comparison price is the price at which
another supplier has offered substantially the same goods or ser-
vices; the trade area to which the advertisement refers is clearly
defined and disclosed; and the advertisement discloses that it is
the price of another supplier and not the former price of the adver-
tising supplier.100
A supplier may advertise its own former price by meeting any
one of the following criteria: (1) the supplier made substantial sales
at or above the former price in the recent regular course of busi-
ness; (2) the supplier openly and actively offered the same or com-
parable goods or services for sale at the former price for a reasona-
bly substantial period of time in the recent regular course of
business, in good faith and not for the purpose of establishing a
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-335.11 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.40 to -207.44 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
97. Id. § 59.1-207.44.
98. Compare id. § 59.1-201(A) (reasonable cause).
99. Id. § 59.1-207.43(B).
100. Id. § 59.1-207.42.
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fictitious higher price; (3) the former price is based on a markup
which does not exceed the supplier's cost plus its usual and cus-
tomary markup in the actual sale of the same or substantially simi-
lar goods or services in the recent regular course of business; or (4)
the advertisement clearly and conspicuously discloses the date on
which substantial sales were made or offered openly and actively at
the former price. 101
H. Virginia Travel Club Act
In 1993, the General Assembly addressed problems in the pre-
paid travel services industry by enacting the Virginia Travel Club
Act.102 This statute applies to "travel clubs," defined as for-profit
organizations that, in return for either an advance fee or an annual
charge exceeding one hundred dollars, grant a customer the privi-
lege to arrange or obtain future travel through or from the organi-
zation.10 3 The legislation creates a term of art, "travel services
agreement," defined, in effect, to be an agreement to provide the
opportunity to reach future agreements on specific travel arrange-
ments. The term excludes agreements for specific travel transpor-
tation, accommodation or other specific services. 10 4
Travel clubs must register with the Virginia Division of Con-
sumer Affairs before offering for sale any travel services agree-
ments. They must also file with the Division a bond with corporate
surety, letter of credit from a bank insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, or cash in the amount of $60,000.00. The
bond is available to provide refunds to consumers who suffer dam-
age caused by violations of the Act. 10 5
The travel club must disclose to the customer in writing that the
customer has a statutory right to cancel the contract within seven
calendar days. If the customer has used any of the club services
prior to such cancellation, the customer owes only for those ser-
vices used. The club must refund the remainder. 0 6
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.41 (RepL Vol. 1992).
102. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 760, 1993 Va. Acts 1083, 1085 (codified at V&. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-15 to -454 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-445 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
104. Id.
105. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-445 to -454 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
106. Id.
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I. Untrue, Deceptive or Misleading Advertising
Under the false advertising statute, the elements of a civil action
for false advertising are: (1) a representation to members of the
public; (2) an intent to induce a sale or consumption; (3) untruth-
fulness or deceptiveness of the representation; and (4) reliance and
damage.1 1 7 Any person who suffers loss caused by a violation of the
statute may sue for the greater of his damages or one hundred dol-
lars, and reasonable attorney's fees.108 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently held that injury
to one's health caused by the advertisements of a diet plan is the
type of damage contemplated by the statute.10 9
J. Multi-Level Marketing Programs and Business Opportunities
Fraud perpetrated in the sale of business opportunities, which
are frequently multi-level marketing programs, has been addressed
mainly by regulatory statutes other than the Virginia Consumer
Protection Act of 1977. The statutes prohibiting pyramid promo-.
tional 10 and referral rebate schemes 1 both predate the VCPA
and provide criminal as well as civil remedies. Although the VCPA
has been amended to cover the sale of business opportunities that
require the consumer's investment and operate out of the con-
sumer's residence, the pyramid promotional and referral rebate
scheme statutes remain separate from the VCPA. It is possible,
however, that a scheme violating the pyramid promotional scheme
statute may simultaneously violate the VCPA.112
1. Pyramid Promotional Schemes or Chain Letters
The statute defines "pyramid promotional scheme'; as "any pro-
gram utilizing a pyramid or chain process by which a participant
gives a valuable consideration for the opportunity to receive com-
pensation or things of value in return for inducing other persons to
107. Id. § 18.2-216 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
108. Id. §§ 59.1-68.3, -68.5 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
109. Maldonado v. Nutri/System, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Va. 1991).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-239 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
111. Id. § 18.2-242.1.
112. Act of Mar. 26, 1987, ch. 464, 1987 V. Acts 617 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
198 (Repl. Vol. 1992)) (amending the VCPA to include certain businesses to be operated out
of a residence and confirming the effect of the Bell decision); see Commonwealth v. Bell, 5
Va. Cir. 296 (Richmond City 1985).
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participate in the program." ' 113 All contracts that give any part of
the consideration for the opportunity to participate in a pyramid
promotional scheme are void and unenforceable." 4 Common-
wealth's Attorneys are authorized to seek appointment of a re-
ceiver to redistribute any assets a participant has received from a
pyramid scheme among the pyramid's victims as well as to prose-
cute criminally.11
5
A pyramid promotional scheme gives valuable consideration to
the promoter. The valuable consideration does not have to be a
cash payment. The time and effort expended to generate sales to
third parties constitute valuable consideration. 116 In determining
whether compensation is based on sales of goods to non-partici-
pants, as opposed to inducement of other persons to participate in
the scheme, the predominant theme of the songs, cheers, printed
materials, and representations about large profits from inducing
others should be considered. This "predominant theme" may out-
weigh testimony by some individuals that they made purchases for
legitimate reasons and not to participate in the scheme.
117
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently considered a multi-level
marketing plan that did not contain overriding commissions on
sales or recruitment by one's own recruits.118 The plan provided
every distributor the opportunity to earn commissions by recruit-
ing additional distributors, but the plan offered no commissions on
subsequent recruitment by one's own recruits." 9 The promoter ar-
gued that this structure did not violate the statute. The court held,
however, that the scheme violated Code of Virginia section 18.2-
239,120 even though it did not provide overriding commissions on
recruitment by one's own recruits.
121
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-239 (Repl. Vol. 1988); see generally Commonwealth v. Dare To
Be Great, Inc., 5 Va. Cir. 430 (Richmond City 1971) (applying and upholding constitutional-
ity of statute).
114. There is a private civil cause of action for violation of the prohibition. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-68.3, -68.5 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-240 (Repl. VoL 1988).
116. Bell v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 298, 302-03, 374 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1988).
117. Id. at 303-04, 374 S.E.2d at 16.
118. Love v. Durastill of Richmond, Inc., 242 Va. 186, 408 S.E.2d 892 (1991).
119. See id. at 190, 408 S.E.2d at 895.
120. VA. CODi ANN. § 18.2-239 (Repl VoL 1988).
121. See id.
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2. Referral Rebate Selling
It is illegal to induce a contract by offering customer A a rebate
or other consideration if A refers additional customers B and C to
the seller, where the payment of the consideration is contingent
upon a subsequent sale, demonstration, or certain other events in-
volving referred customers B or C. 122
This statute covers certain sales of goods or services but not
sales of real estate or intangibles. Contracts induced in whole or in
part by the offer of such contingent payments or credits are void
and unenforceable. The consumer may keep the goods or sue for a
refund. 2 '
3. New Businesses Sold to Consumers Who Expect to Operate
from their Residences
The VCPA applies its remedies and rules of conduct to the sale
of a new business opportunity requiring personal effort or time to
be operated from one's residence.124 A typical work-at-home busi-
ness may also be subject to scrutiny under each of the pyramid
scheme or referral rebate statutes. The VCPA prohibits all misrep-
resentations in connection with the sale of such business opportu-
nities, such as misrepresentation of earnings of others, existing
markets, necessary expertise, and time required. 25
K. Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act
Popularly known as the "Lemon Law," the Motor Vehicle War-
ranty Enforcement Act' 26 is enforceable through private civil ac-
tions. 27 No state or local agency has enforcement authority. The
Lemon Law provides rights during the period ending eighteen
months after the date of the original delivery to a consumer of a
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-242.1 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
123. V& CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-68.3, -68.5 (Repl. Vol. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-242.1(c)
(Repl. Vol. 1988).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (Cum. Supp. 1993). For a pre-VCPA business opportunity
case apparently tried on a breach of warranty claim, see McNeir v. Greer-Hale Chinchilla
Ranch, 194 Va. 623, 74 S.E.2d 165 (1953).
126. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.11 to -207.16 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.14 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (creating a cause of action and pro-
vides that the successful consumer "shall recover reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness
fees and court costs . . . ." (emphasis added)).
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new motor vehicle.'2 8 If a new vehicle is sold by the first consumer
to a second consumer during this period, the second consumer may
also claim the benefits of the Lemon Law in some circumstances.129
The Lemon Law's primary benefit is its augmentation of the
warranty remedies that the manufacturer provides voluntarily. A
typical express warranty provides that the manufacturer will repair
or replace defective parts within a certain period of time or below a
certain mileage. The Lemon Law provides that the manufacturer
must remedy the problem in a "reasonable number of attempts,"
rather than simply repair or replace parts that might again exhibit
the same defects. 130 The Lemon Law creates an evidentiary pre-
sumption that a reasonable number of repair attempts have been
made if, during the Lemon Law rights period, either of three fact
patterns is proved: (1) "the same nonconformity to the warranty
has been subject to repair three or more times," but continues to
exist; (2) "the nonconformity is a serious safety defect and has
been subject to repair one or more times," but continues to exist;
or (3) the vehicle has been out of service due to repair for a cumu-
lative total of thirty calendar days for any combination of different
nonconformities, unless the repairs could not be performed be-
cause of conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer. 13 1
If the vehicle is not conformed to its warranty after a "reasona-
ble number of repair attempts," then the consumer is entitled to a
comparable replacement vehicle or rescission of the contract, plus
damages for mileage, expenses, and loss of use necessitated by at-
tempts to conform the vehicle to the warranty. 132 The manufac-
turer, on the other hand, may subtract a reasonable allowance for
use.1
3 3
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.11. The 18 month period shall be extended if the manufac-
turer has been notified, but the nonconformity has not been effectively repaired within the
lemon law rights period. The length of the extension, however, is not specified. VA CODE
ANN. § 59.1-207.13(C) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
129. Id. (defining "consumer" to include any person to whom such vehicle is transferred
for the same personal, family or household purposes during the duration of any warranty
applicable to the vehicle, and any other persons entitled by the warranty itself to enforce it.
Thus, a subsequent consumer transferee within 18 months may or may not have rights
under the Lemon Law, and the outcome will depend on the terms of the warranty).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 59.1-207.13(A).
133. Id. "Reasonable allowance for use" is defined as one half or less of the mileage de-
duction allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for business use of a personal vehicle. VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.11 (Repl. VoL 1992).
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In Cook v. Ford Motor Co.,1 3 4 the manufacturer refused to accept
the consumer's return of a vehicle, despite six unsuccessful repair
attempts. The consumer stopped using and making payments on
the vehicle. Ford Motor Credit Company then repossessed it.
When the consumer filed suit under the Lemon Law, the manufac-
turer denied liability on the ground that the consumer was not
able to return the vehicle (because of the repossession). 13 5 The
court denied the manufacturer's motion for partial summary judg-
ment and held that,
[w]hile the statute does not explicitly make relief dependent upon
the return of the vehicle, even were the Act read to implicitly re-
quire return as a condition of remedy, the Act does not require
numberless, repeated attempts to return the vehicle in the face of
the manufacturer's refusal to accept return or to make arrangements
for return.""6
L. Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act
In 1992, the General Assembly addressed residential real estate
transactions in a relatively comprehensive statute, the Virginia
Residential Property Disclosure Act.. 37 This act significantly
changes the rules applicable to such contracts fully executed by all
the parties on or after July 1, 1993.138
1. Applicability
This act applies to sales and leases with an option to buy resi-
dential real property consisting of not less than one or more than
four dwelling units, including those transactions in which a li-
censed broker or salesperson is involved. The act does not apply,
however, to transfers pursuant to a court order, foreclosure, estate
settlements, or divorce. 3 9 The act also applies, though with a dif-
134. 24 Va. Cir. 377 (Fairfax County 1991).
135. Id. at 378.
136. Id. at 379.
137. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
138. Id. § 55-525.
139. Id. §§ 55-517, -518, -525.
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ferent rule of conduct, to the sale of a new dwelling by its
builder.14
0
2. Disclosures Required
a. Used Property
The selling owner must provide on a form promulgated by the
Real Estate Board, either:
(1) an "as is" disclaimer covering all defects, if any, or all defects
other than those listed in purchase contract; or
(2) a disclosure of defects already known to bwner, with:
(a) notice to buyers that they may wish to secure their own
professional inspection, and
(b) notice that the representations are made only by the
owner and not by the broker or salesperson.141
The disclosure need not mention that an occupant was afflicted
with HIV or that the property was the site of either a homicide,
felony, suicide, or any occurrence having no effect on the physical
structure of the real property. The owner is not required to under-
take any independent inspection of the property in order to make
the required disclosures. 142
b. New Dwellings
The builder cannot use a disclaimer. The builder must disclose
in writing all known material defects that would constitute a viola-
tion of any applicable building code. Such disclosure does not ab-
rogate any warranty or any other contractual obligations of the
builder to the purchaser.1 43
3. Time for Disclosure or Disclaimer
The disclosure or disclaimer must be delivered prior to accept-
ance of a contract, or as an addendum to a contract. A second
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-518 (Cum. Supp. 1993)). For sale of new homes, see the one year
implied warranty in Id. § 55-70.1.
141. Id. § 55-519.
142. Id. § 55-524(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
143. See supra note 138.
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statement, which cannot be a disclaimer, is required at or before
settlement in the form of a disclosure of any material changes in
the physical condition, or a certification that the condition is sub-
stantially the same as when the original disclosure form was
provided.144
4. Owner Liability
An owner is not liable for error, inaccuracy, or omission of infor-
mation delivered pursuant to this chapter if the owner had no ac-
tual knowledge of the error, inaccuracy, or omission, or if the error,
inaccuracy, or omission was based on information provided by a
public agency or certain professionals, such as an engineer or
contractor.14 5
5. Liability of Real Estate Licensee
A licensed real estate broker or agent (licensee) must inform his
client of the obligation to disclose or disclaim, as noted above. If
the purchaser is not represented by a licensee, then the owner's
licensee must also inform the purchaser of the purchaser's right to
such disclosure or disclaimer and its effect on the purchaser. If the
licensee provides this information, then the licensee will not be lia-
ble for any failure to disclose or for any violation of the Residential
Property Disclosure Act.146
6. Remedies
If the seller makes a misrepresentation in the disclosure state-
ment, the buyer may have a choice between suit for damages and
cancellation of contract. The buyer may sue for damages suffered
as a result of defects existing on the date of contract which would
have been disclosed in compliance with the act and of which buyer
was not aware at the time of settlement, if a contract for a sale, or
an occupancy where the lease includes the option to buy. Alterna-
tively, the buyer may elect to terminate the contract instead of su-
ing for damages. 147
144. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-520(A), -522 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
145. Id. § 55-521.
146. Id. § 55-523.
147. Id. § 55-524.
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The sole remedy for delivery of a disclosure or disclaimer after
the deadline set by section 55-520 appears to be termination of the
contract.148 For failure to deliver either the disclaimer or disclo-
sure, however, the buyer may either terminate the contract or sue
for damages. 149
If the buyer elects to terminate for late delivery, non-delivery or
misrepresentation, he must do so at or prior to the earliest of: (1)
three days after delivery of the disclosure or disclaimer in person;
(2) five days after the postmark, if the disclosure or disclaimer is
properly mailed; (3) settlement; (4) occupancy by the purchaser;
(5) execution of a waiver of right of termination in a writing sepa-
rate from the real estate contract; or (6) purchaser's written appli-
cation to a lender for a mortgage loan where the application con-
tains a disclosure that the act of applying for the loan terminates
the right of termination.150
7. Defendants and Causes of Action
Sections 55-521 and 55-524(B)(1), read together, appear to abol-
ish the common law cause of action for constructive fraud against
sellers of used residential real property who comply with the dis-
closure or disclaimer provisions of the chapter.
The statute and case law leave one question unanswered in par-
ticular: does the use of an "as is" disclaimer by an owner who is
aware of material defects insulate him from liability for willful
nondisclosure? In other words, is the common law action for fraud
based on deliberate nondisclosure to a buyer who is known to labor
under a mistake of fact, as in Spence v. Griffin,151 preserved by
section 55-524(B)(2), or is the common law action instead negated
by the owner's delivery of a disclaimer? The relevant section of the
Act provides in part: "Nothing contained herein shall prevent a
purchaser from pursuing any remedies at law or equity otherwise
available against an owner in the event of an owner's intentional or
willful misrepresentation of the condition of the subject prop-
erty." '152 This section of the statute uses language which would ap-
pear to encompass intentional, fraudulent nondisclosure. This sec-
148. Id. § 55-520.
149. Id. § 55-524.
150. Id. § 55-520.
151. 236 Va. 21, 28, 372 S.E.2d 595, 598-99 (1988).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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tion'thus appears to preserve the cause of action recognized in
Spence.15' The preservation of this cause of action for nondisclo-
sure implies that the disclaimer may be used only by an owner who
is truly ignorant of the defects which are disclaimed. By this infer-
ence and deduction, the courts may determine that this act in fact
creates a duty to disclose on the part of owners with knowledge of
defects.
Unlike the longer two-year statute of limitations for most other
actions for fraud,5 the applicable limitation under the Virginia
Residential Property Disclosure Act is one year from receipt of dis-
closure or disclaimer statement. If no disclosure statement was de-
livered, the limitation is one year from settlement if by sale, or
occupancy if by lease with option to buy.155
III. PROCEDURAL LAW
A. Governmental Enforcement Actions
The Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth's Attorneys
and attorneys for any county, city or town (government attorneys),
may sue for injunction, civil penalties, costs and restitution for
individuals. 15
Absent the target's intent to flee or hide assets and a reasonable
determination that irreparable harm may occur without immediate
action, the government attorneys usually must provide written no-
tice of intent to sue and offer either an opportunity to explain or
an opportunity to execute an assurance of voluntary compliance.1
Admissions made during discussion of a possible assurance of vol-
untary compliance have been held inadmissible to prove violations
in later proceedings under the VCPA. 58
Ex parte pre-suit investigative orders are possible if voluntary
requests for information or documents are unproductive. 59 The
target of the order usually has twenty-one days from the date of
service to comply or file and argue objections. Information ob-
153. 236 Va. at 28, 372 S.E.2d at 598-99.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Rep. Vol. 1992).
155. Id. § 55-524(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
156. Id. §§ 59.1-201, -203, -205 & -206 (Repl. Vol. 1992); See, e.g., Bell v. Commonwealth,
236 Va. 298, 374 S.E.2d 13 (1988).
157. Id. § 59.1-203(B).
158. Stitt v. Nautilus Enter., Inc., 17 Va. Cir. 150 (Fairfax County 1989).
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-201 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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tained from such orders can be used only for enforcement of the
VCPA.6 0
The government attorneys must have reasonable cause to believe
that someone has violated, is violating, or intends to violate the
VCPA in order to obtain an investigative order. 161 The supplier
suspected of a violation does not have to be the same as the person
to whom the investigative order is directed. 162 The order may com-
pel production by innocent third parties such as banks. Reasonable
cause requires less of a showing than does probable cause. Reason-
able cause may be found in a supplier's promotional materials
without considering testimony from consumers. 163
In actions brought by government attorneys, the court may
award relief for an entire class of victims, including those who are
not identified until after the trial."6 Civil penalties and costs may
be imposed for willful violations."6 5
Imprisonment for criminal contempt of injunction issued under
the VCPA is possible. However, a civil penalty imposed as punish-
ment has been held to be punitive in fact despite its label. 66 Thus,
a subsequent jail sentence as additional penalty for criminal con-
tempt for the same conduct has been held to violate the prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy..6 7
B. Private Suit
Any person who suffers loss may file a private suit for actual
damages or one hundred dollars, whichever is greater, plus reason-
able attorney's fees. 68 The VCPA's definition of "person" includes
corporations as well as individuals."6 9 An insurer, which has paid
its insured consumer for loss, may be subrogated to consumer's
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Act of Mar. 26, 1987, ch. 464, 1987 Va. Acts 617 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
201). This Act eliminated the restriction of investigative orders to suspected violators, and
instead permitted the issuance of an order against anyone with information. Id.
163. In re American Dollar Exch., Inc., 27 Va. Cir. 428 (Campbell County 1992).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-205 (Repl. Vol. 1992); see also In re Fravel, 143 B.R. 1001
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-206 (Repl. Vol. 1992); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bell, 5 Va.
Cir. 296 (Richmond City 1985) (awarding $33,500 in civil penalties and $7,400 in costs).
166. Small v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 314, 398 S.E.2d 98 (1990).
167. Id. at 317, 398 S.E.2d at 100.
168. Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-204 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
169. Id. § 59.1-198.
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cause of action. 17 0 Also, a contractual limitation of liability for neg-
ligence does not limit liability for damages under the VCPA."'
It appears that this private cause of action provides, in some in-
stances, a remedy different from that available in governmental
enforcement actions. Section 59.1-204, which creates the private
cause of action, permits the plaintiff to recover actual damages or
one hundred dollars, whichever is greater. 172 Section 59.1-205, how-
ever, provides that, in connection with a permanent injunction
which can be sought only by a government attorney, the court may
enter additional orders necessary to restore any money or property
obtained by a deceptive practice to all persons identified within
180 days of entry of the injunction.173 The term "restore" implies
restitution, not damages. Damages might far exceed the con-
sumer's out of pocket loss, but restitution contemplates only the
out of pocket loss.7 4
The conclusion that sections 59.1-204 and 59.1-205 contemplate
different remedies is bolstered by the last clause of section 59.1-
207. For unintentional violations, the consumer's only remedy in a
private suit is "restitution." Thus, for unintentional violations, the
minimum statutory remedy of one hundred dollars in damages is
supplanted by the express provision for restitution in section 59.1-
207. 5 A consumer who has suffered actual damage of only thirty-
five dollars caused by an unintentional violation may recover only
thirty-five dollars.
C. Unintentional Violations
In certain situations, a supplier may avoid liability for damages
and instead limit its liability to restitution. Likewise, the supplier
may avoid its liability for the consumer's attorney's fees and costs.
This limitation is permitted by section 59.1-207. The limitation is
established by a showing that the violation of the VCPA was a
170. See Gill v. Rollins Protection Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1985).
171. Id.
172. Disharoon v. Wintergreen Dev., Inc., No. 90-0014-C (W.D. Va. May 20, 1991) (hold-
ing that § 59.1-204 provides a cause of action for damages, but not for rescission) (unpub-
lished opinion).
173. VA. CODE. ANN. § 59.1-205 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
174. Cf. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 835, 27 S.E.2d 198, 203
(1943) (holding that compensatory damages for common law fraud include all which "fairly,
reasonably, and naturally flowed from the wrong in the ordinary course of events.").
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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bona fide error that occurred despite the supplier's operation of a
system or procedure reasonably designed to avoid such errors.176
IV. CONCLUSION
Consumer protection in Virginia involves a variety of statutes
covering different types of businesses and specific practices. The
General Assembly has recently enacted several new laws and
amended older consumer laws. Indeed, the entire subject area is
relatively new as the VCPA was enacted in 1977. The most recent
developments have been in the area of residential property sales,
travel clubs, and prize and gift promotions.
Almost all Virginia consumer protection statutes provide for the
award of attorney's fees to the successful consumer. Given this in-
centive to private litigation, it is surprising that so few consumer
cases are reported. Perhaps, as articles like this spread the word,
more members of the bar will discover this subject area. As more
discover the subject, perhaps some hearty souls will even under-
take the representation of some consumer, who could not otherwise
afford counsel, in hopes of winning attorney's fees from the
opponent.
176. Id. § 59.1-207. In subsection (ii) of section 59.1-207, the language "bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid a violation" is
drawn from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1993).

